This paper analyzes optimal risk sharing among agents that are endowed with either expected utility preferences or with dual utility preferences. We find that Pareto optimal risk redistributions and the competitive equilibria can be obtained via bargaining with a hypothetical representative agent of expected utility maximizers and a hypothetical representative agent of dual utility maximizers. The representative agent of expected utility maximizers resembles an average risk-averse agent, whereas representative agent of dual utility maximizers resembles an agent that has lowest aversion to mean-preserving spreads. This bargaining leads to an allocation of the aggregate risk to both groups of agents. The optimal contract for the expected utility maximizers is proportional to their allocated risk, and the optimal contract for the dual utility maximizing agents is given by "tranching" of their allocated risk. We show a method to derive equilibrium prices. We identify a condition under which prices are locally independent of the expected utility functions, and given in closed form. Moreover, we characterize uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium.
Introduction
This paper studies risk sharing in markets with expected utility maximizers and with dual utility maximizers. Expected utility is often applied as preference relation for individuals, whereas dual utility is often applied to model the preferences of firms. Expected utility is characterized in the seminal work of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) , and is well-studied in the economic literature. Dual utility is characterized by Yaari (1987) by a modification of the independence axiom in expected utility theory. For expected utility theory, the independence axiom requires independence with respect to probability mixtures of risks. For dual theory, the modified independence axiom requires independence with respect to direct mixing the realizations of the risks. The preferences towards risk are linear in the pay-offs but non-linear in the probabilities. Its main property is cash invariance. This means that cash payments do not affect risk preferences. Dual theory has applications in both actuarial science and finance, as it is related to the concept of coherent risk measures (Artzner et al., 1999) . It includes the Expected Shortfall that gained interest after the introduction of Basel III and Swiss Solvency Test regulations.
Risk sharing is a classical topic in actuarial science. There is a stream of papers that analyze optimal risk sharing in settings where all agents maximize expected utilities (Borch, 1962; Wilson, 1968; Raviv, 1979; Bühlmann and Jewell, 1979; Bühlmann, 1980 Bühlmann, , 1984 Aase, 1993 Aase, , 2010 . More recently, risk sharing in settings with dual utility maximizing agents is studied in the literature as well (Filipović and Kupper, 2008; Jouini et al., 2008; Ludkovski and Young, 2009; Dana and Le Van, 2010; Boonen, 2015 Boonen, , 2017 . To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to analyze markets in which both types of agents coexist. We do not argue that either expected utility or dual utility is better, and we do not find any clear arguments why not both types of agents might coexist in the market. In economic experiments, there is no clear consensus for one of these two preference relations as well (see, e.g., Hey and Orme, 1994) . Heterogeneous agents models gained substantial interest in economics and finance (see Hommes, 2006 , for an overview).
Our approach in this paper is twofold. First, we characterize all Pareto optimal risk redistributions. In this way, we generalize in this way the results of Borch (1962) for expected utilities and the results of Jouini et al. (2008) and Ludkovski and Young (2009) for dual utilities. Second, we select a specific Pareto optimal risk redistribution using the concept of competitive equilibria in a market where agents act as price-takers. We determine the equilibrium prices and corresponding risk redistributions and characterize uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium. Moreover, we illustrate the construction of the equilibrium in some special cases. This paper is related to the equilibrium model of Chateauneuf et al. (2000) and Tsanakas and Christofides (2006) . They all use rank dependent utility (RDU) preferences in order to derive the Pareto optimal risk sharing contracts and the competitive equilibrium. Rank dependent utility preferences are originally characterized by Quiggin (1982 Quiggin ( , 1992 and Schmeidler (1989) , and generalize both expected and dual utility. In order to derive a solution, Chateauneuf et al. (2000) , Tsanakas and Christofides (2006) need all agents to have strictly concave expected utility and distortion functions. Pareto optimal risk redistributions are similar to the solution with regular expected utilities, but with heterogeneous distorted probability measures. This is in line with Wilson (1968) , who studies markets with expected utility maximizers using subjective probabilities. Moreover, Tsanakas and Christofides (2006) obtain the competitive equilibrium by solving the first-order conditions where the comonotonicity conditions are slack. Strzalecki and Werner (2011) analyze comonotonicity of Pareto optimal risk redistributions in the context of ambiguity. They show that all Pareto optimal risk redistributions are comonotone if agents use strictly convex preferences. Dual utility preferences are not strictly convex. In our model, either the utility function or the distorted probabilities are linear for every agent. Then, comonotonicity of equilibrium risk redistributions is used as constraint in order to solve the solution numerically. We find that the corresponding equilibrium prices and risk redistributions are substantially different compared to Chateauneuf et al. (2000) and Tsanakas and Christofides (2006) . Chateauneuf et al. (2000) and Tsanakas and Christofides (2006) find that the prices depend also on expected utility functions, whereas we find that prices may be locally independent of the expected utility functions.
This paper also contributes to the literature that study uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium. This is analyzed by Aase (1993 Aase ( , 2010 for expected utility preferences and by Boonen (2015 Boonen ( , 2017 for dual utility maximizers. We derive a condition that characterizes uniqueness of the equilibrium. This condition is identical to one property of Boonen (2015) , who states the condition for a market with only dual utility maximizers. Uniqueness of the equilibrium is relevant as it allows us to formalize the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) based on the unique prices. The prices follow from specific dual utility preferences in the market. Testing the equilibrium prices that we derive is mathematically equivalent to the test of De Giorgi and Post (2008) on US stock returns. They show a better fit than the classical CAPM model with mean-variance investors. Therefore, De Giorgi and Post (2008) provide an empirical motivation for the results in this paper as well.
This paper is set out as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 analyzes Pareto optimality. Section 4 characterizes the competitive equilibrium prices, as well as a characterization of uniqueness of the corresponding equilibrium risk redistribution. Section 5 illustrates the competitive equilibrium in case all expected utility maximizers use exponential utility functions. Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper.
Model outline
We consider a one-period model with a pre-determined future time. All random variables discussed in this paper are on a probability space (Ω, F, P) such that:
• the state space Ω is finite. Let F the power set on Ω, and the cardinality of Ω equals p > 1;
• P({ω}) > 0 for all ω ∈ Ω. The probability measure is common knowledge.
We denote IR Ω as the set of all random variables on the state space Ω. Dual utility is introduced by Yaari (1987) . Moreover, it is characterized as a premium principle by Wang et al. (1997) , which is called a distortion risk measure ρ. Dual utility is given by
for a continuous, concave and increasing distortion function g : [0, 1] → [0, 1] with g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1, where F X is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of random variable X. Here, X is interpreted as a future gain. We explicitly assume concavity of the distortion function g, which is equivalent to aversion to mean-preserving spreads (Yaari, 1987) . Every distortion risk measure is coherent (see Wang et al., 1997) , which is later defined by Artzner et al. (1999) . For a random variable X ∈ IR Ω such that X(ω 1 ) ≤ · · · ≤ X(ω p ), it holds that:
where Q : F → (0, 1] is the additive mapping such that
Throughout this paper, we assume that there exists:
• a finite collection of Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximizing agents that is given by N 1 = {1, . . . , n 1 }; the corresponding utility functions are given by u i , i ∈ N 1 . Moreover, we assume that u i (·) > 0, u i (·) < 0, and that the Inada conditions lim x→−∞ u i (x) = ∞ and lim x→∞ u i (x) = 0 are satisfied for all i ∈ N 1 ;
• a finite collection of dual utility maximizing agents that is given by N 2 = {n 1 + 1, . . . , n 1 + n 2 }; the corresponding distortion functions are strictly concave, and given by g i , i ∈ N 2 .
Later in this paper (Proposition 4.6), we will discuss results in case the distortion functions are concave instead of strictly concave. We define N = N 1 ∪N 2 . Agent i ∈ N holds a random variable X i ∈ IR Ω that we denote as risk. Generally, we define the utility of agent i ∈ N as:
for all X ∈ IR Ω . For an overview of the differences between expected utility and dual utility, we refer to Wang and Young (1998) . Dual utilities can be represented as Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utilities if and only if the distortion function is given by g(x) = x for all x ∈ [0, 1], i.e., if the agent is risk-neutral: V (X) = E P [X] for all X ∈ IR Ω . This follows directly from the fact that the only class of expected utility functions satisfying positive homogeneity 1 is the class of linear utility functions.
Pareto optimality
In Section 2, we defined the preferences (expected and dual utilities) that are present in the market that we consider in this paper. In this section, we provide a full characterization of Pareto optimality in such markets. Moreover, we provide an algorithm to 1 A preference relation V : IR Ω → IR is positive homogeneous if V (αX) = αV (X) for all α > 0 and all X ∈ IR Ω .
compute the Pareto optimal risk redistributions. In order to define Pareto optimality properly, we first define the set of feasible risk redistributions as follows:
A risk redistribution is called Pareto optimal if there does not exist another feasible redistribution that is weakly better for all agents, and strictly better for at least one agent. The set of Pareto optimal risk redistributions is given by
where for every a, b ∈ IR N , a b means a i ≥ b i for every i ∈ N and a = b. Here, the preferences V i , i ∈ N, are given in (4). From Kiesel and Rüschendorf (2007, Theorem 3 .3 therein), we get that the Pareto optimal risk redistributions are obtained by maximizing
over all ( X i ) i∈N ∈ X , where k ∈ IR N ++ . 2 We impose the normalization k n 1 +n 2 = 1. Denote ρ * N 2 as the distortion risk measure generated by the strictly concave distortion function g * 
where the minimum is taken over all ( X i ) i∈N 2 such that i∈N 2 X i = X. Analogous to Jouini et al. (2008, Theorem 3 .1 therein) for k not equal to the unit-vector, we get that min i∈N 2 k i ρ i ( X i ) does not exist for non-degenerate for all i ∈ N 2 , where the minimum is taken over all ( X i ) i∈N 2 such that i∈N 2 X i = X. Therefore, we set k i = 1 for all i ∈ N 2 , and the objective function in (7) can be written as
A risk redistribution ( X i ) i∈N ∈ X is called comonotone with each other if there exists an ordering (ω 1 , . . . , ω p ) of the state space Ω such that
Existence of a Pareto optimal comonotone risk redistribution is shown by Landsberger and Meilijson (1994) . They show that any allocation of an aggregate risk i∈N X i is dominated by a comonotone allocation in the sense of second order stochastic dominance. Carlier et al. (2012, Theorem 3 .1 therein) extend this result by showing that every strictly concave order preserving preference relation is such that for every non-comonotone risk redistribution, there exists a comonotone risk redistribution that Pareto dominates it. Moreover, Chew et al. (1987, Corollary 2 therein) show that dual utilities generated by a strictly concave distortion function strictly preserve the concave order. For strictly concave expected utility functions, this holds by definition (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970) . From this follows directly the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1 Every ( X i ) i∈N ∈ PO is comonotone with each other, where the set PO is defined in (6).
From Lemma 3.1, we get that all Pareto optimal risk redistributions are comonotone with the aggregate risk i∈N X i . So, there exists an ordering of the finite probability space Ω such that for all ( X i ) i∈N ∈ PO we have
Without loss of generality, we define the state space Ω = {ω 1 , . . . , ω p } such that
Moreover, we write Ω = {ω 1 , . . . , ω } for all ∈ {1, . . . , p}, and Ω 0 = ∅. We will refer to the comonotonicity constraints as (2)- (3), and (8), we immediately derive that Pareto optimal risk redistributions ( X i ) i∈N are characterized as the ones that satisfy the following optimization problem:
which is maximized over all ( X i ) i∈N ∈ X such that the comonotonicity constraints are satisfied and
where
(P(Ω −1 )) for all ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Since the objective function in (9) is concave, it follows from the Inada conditions that the objective in (9) is bounded from above. In this section, we solve this optimization problem using variational calculus.
From Lemma 3.1, we directly get the following corollary.
for all i ∈ N and for all Pareto optimal risk redistributions X i , i ∈ N .
So, if i∈N X i (ω) = i∈N X i (ω ) we tread the set {ω, ω } as one state. If N = N 1 , we get from Borch (1962) that a risk redistribution ( X i ) i∈N 1 ∈ X is Pareto optimal if and only if there exists a k ∈ IR N 1 ++ such that
for all ω ∈ Ω. Moreover, if N = N 2 , Jouini et al. (2008) show that a necessary and sufficient condition for a risk redistribution ( X i ) i∈N ∈ X to be Pareto optimal is given by
The following theorem extends these results for the case that there are some agents in the market maximizing utility and some agents that maximize dual utility. Since the objective function in (9) is concave and the constraints are all affine, we can use the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions to get that the Pareto optimal risk redistributions.
for all ∈ {1, . . . , p}, and
where i∈N 2
Proof The objective function in (9) can be written as
This function is maximized over all
, where (13) holds. We first leave out the conditions X i (ω 1 ) ≤ · · · ≤ X i (ω p ) for i ∈ N 1 ; we will later verify that these conditions are satisfied.
Since the objective function in (14) is concave and the constraints are all affine, we get that the Pareto optimal risk redistributions ( X i ) i∈N are characterized by the KarushKuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. The KKT conditions are obtained by the first-order conditions of (14) with respect to X i (ω ):
if i ∈ N 1 , and, otherwise, we get
andγ i∈N 2
, . . . , p − 1} and i ∈ N , wherê λ ∈ IR andγ ≥ 0 are the Lagrangian multipliers of the constraints i∈N X i (ω ) = i∈N X i (ω ) and i∈N 2 X i (ω ) ≤ i∈N 2 X i (ω +1 ), respectively. For a givenλ > 0, the equation (15) has a solution since u i (·) > 0, u i (·) < 0 and the Inada conditions are satisfied for every i ∈ N 1 . This follows directly from the Intermediate Value Theorem. Hence, the result follows directly.
Next, we verify that
. This leads toγ = 0. Because the distortion functions g i , i ∈ N are strictly concave, it holds that the function g * N 2
is strictly concave as well. From this and
for anyγ −1 ,γ +1 ≥ 0. Hence, the solution in (12) satisfies X i (ω 1 ) ≤ · · · ≤ X i (ω p ) for i ∈ N 1 due to strict concavity of the utility functions u i , i ∈ N 1 . This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.3.
We proceed with characterizing uniqueness of the Pareto optimal risk redistributions. We know from Jouini et al. (2008) that there are multiple solutions to (13). For the agents in N 1 , we next show that the system (12) in Theorem 3.3 yields the same risks for a given value of k.
++ . Given a positive value of (12), there is a unique solution of X i , i ∈ N 1 due to u i (·) > 0, u i (·) < 0 and that u i satisfies the Inada conditions for all i ∈ N 1 (Intermediate Value Theorem). We tread the set N 2 as one representative agent with preferences V (X) = −ρ * N 2 (X), which will bear the risk i∈N 2 X i . Next, we show that there is a unique value of (12) that satisfies the KKT conditions. Existence of a solution follows from existence of a solution of (9). Suppose there are two solutions (X i ) i∈N , (X i ) i∈N ∈ X solving the system in Theorem 3.3, and are not equal to each other for an agent i ∈ N 1 . So, (X i ) i∈N and (X i ) i∈N both solve (9). Then, we that
is a strict improvement for agent i due to strict concavity of the utility function u i . Moreover, we have for all i ∈ N 1 that
due to concavity of u i . Hence, we get from this and the fact that an expectation is additive that
So, not both (X i ) i∈N , (X i ) i∈N ∈ X solve (9). This is a contradiction, which concludes the proof.
++ , there is a unique vectorγ ∈ IR p−1 + that solves the system in Theorem 3.3.
Proof Supposeγ 1 andγ 2 both solve the system in Theorem 3.3 andγ 1 =γ 2 . Then, the righthand side of (12) is different for some state index ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Due to strict concavity of the expected utility functions u i , i ∈ N 1 , this leads to different solutions of X i , i ∈ N 1 for the choices ofγ 1 andγ 2 . Hence, these solutions do not both solve the system in Theorem 3.3 due to Proposition 3.4. This concludes the proof.
Suppose N 2 = ∅, and define
Given i∈N 2 X i , all Pareto optimal risk redistributions for agents in N 2 follow from (13). From Jouini et al. (2008, Proposition 3 .1 therein), we get that for all m ∈ M and d ∈ IR N 2 with i∈N 2 d i = i∈N 2 X i (ω p ), it holds that (X i ) i∈N 2 is Pareto optimal, wherê (20) 1 m(k)=i = 1 if m(k) = i and zero otherwise, and where the risk e A ∈ IR Ω for A ∈ F is given by
We refer to the structure of risk redistributions in (20) as tranching.
If the sets N 1 and N 2 are both non-empty, one can use for a given k ∈ IR N 1 ++ the following two-step procedure to solve for the Pareto optimal risk redistributions:
• solve the system in Theorem 3.3; we get the Pareto optimal risk profiles X i , i ∈ N 1 . By Proposition 3.4, these risk profiles are unique given vector k;
• we compute i∈N 2
and determine non-unique Pareto optimal risk redistributions X i , i ∈ N 2 from (20).
For every risk redistribution problem, there is an allocation of the aggregate risk i∈N X i to group N 1 and group N 2 . Given i∈N 1 X i for group N 1 , the Pareto optimal risk redistribution follows from (11). If the agents in N 1 all use an equi-cautious Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) expected utility function, the Pareto optimal risk redistribution is an affine contract on i∈N 1 X i (Wilson, 1968) . Given i∈N 2 X i , the Pareto optimal risk redistribution is given by tranching of this risk i∈N 2 X i .
We next show an algorithm to solve the Pareto optimal risk redistributions via Theorem 3.3 for any given k ∈ IR N 1 ++ . Corresponding to vector k, we aim to find the unique Pareto optimal X i , i ∈ N 1 , as all Pareto optimal X i , i ∈ N 2 , given i∈N 2 X i , are given in (20).
1. Setγ = 0 for all ∈ {1, . . . , p − 1}. Solve the system (12) for givenγ to obtain ( X i ) i∈N .
If i∈N
for all i ∈ N (see Theorem 3.3); stop here. Otherwise, go to the next step.
3. Find the first ∈ {1, . . . , p − 1} for which there exists an z ∈ {0, 1, . . .} such that i∈N 2
X i (ω +z+1 ) with one strict inequality. Take this largest z for which this series of inequalities hold. Then, determineγ a ≥ 0, a ∈ { , . . . , + z} such that i∈N 2 X i (ω ) = · · · = i∈N 2 X i (ω +z+1 ) for solutions of (12) with givenγ. Then, go back to Step 2.
In this algorithm, it may be tedious to solve Step 3 when the size z is large. At least we know from Theorem 3.3 that it yields a Pareto optimal risk redistribution. From Proposition 3.4, we get for every Pareto optimal risk redistribution ( X i ) i∈N that the risks X i , i ∈ N 1 are the same for given k ∈ IR N 1 ++ . So, the algorithm selects this unique risks X i , i ∈ N 1 corresponding to Pareto optimal risk redistributions ( X i ) i∈N .
We proceed this paper with characterizing specific Pareto optimal risk redistributions, namely the competitive equilibria. We discuss this topic in the next section.
Competitive Equilibria

Definition and characterization
Let the pricing function be linear, i.e., we have π(p, X) = ω∈Ωp ω X(ω) for all X ∈ IR Ω . So avoid arbitrage, we assume that the price vectorp is strictly positive, i.e.,p ∈ IR Ω ++ . The risk-free rate is set equal to zero, i.e., π(p, e Ω ) = 1. This assumption will serve as a normalization, as the equilibrium risk redistributions do not depend on it. The economy will be in equilibrium when every agent i ∈ N solves max
where the price vectorp induces market clearing, i.e.,
Existence of competitive equilibria follows from Arrow and Debreu (1954) and Werner (1987) . The First Fundamental Welfare Theorem states that any equilibrium is Pareto optimal. This theorem applies to our setting as the preferences are non-satiated (Arrow, 1963) . If N = N 1 or N = N 2 , competitive equilibria are studied by, e.g., Borch (1962) , Aase (1993 Aase ( , 2010 , Filipović and Kupper (2008) , and Dana and Le Van (2010) .
Theorem 4.1 Let N 1 , N 2 = ∅, and recall the definition of a competitive equilibrium in (22)-(24). Then, (p, ( X i ) i∈N ) is an equilibrium if and only if we have ( X i ) i∈N ∈ X ,
with λ ∈ IR N ++ , and the price vectorp is given bŷ
Here, γ ≥ 0, ∈ {1, . . . , p − 1} are the Lagrangian parameters of
where X i , i ∈ N 1 follow from (25)-(26).
Proof From the First Fundamental Welfare Theorem (Arrow, 1963) , we get that any competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal. Therefore, according to Lemma 3.1, all equilibrium risk redistributions must be comonotone with each other. Then, if we explicitly impose that X i is comonotone with each other, we can write
(P(Ω −1 )) for all ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Since the objective function is concave and the constraints are all affine, we get that the equilibrium risk redistributions ( X i ) i∈N are characterized by the KKT conditions one-to-one. The KKT conditions are obtained by the first-order conditions of the following function with respect to X i (ω ):
where λ i ∈ IR, i ∈ N are the Lagrangian parameters of the price constraint and γ i, ≥ 0, i ∈ N, ∈ {1, . . . , p − 1} are the Lagrangian parameters of the comonotonicity constraints. For agents in N 1 , we now assume that X i , i ∈ N 1 are such that γ i, = 0 for all i ∈ N 1 , ∈ {1, . . . , p − 1}. We check at the end of this proof that the risks X i , i ∈ N 1 are indeed comonotone with i∈N X i . Then, the KKT conditions are given by
for all i ∈ N 2 . Since g i (0) = 0 and g i (1) = 1, it holds that
and, moreover, it holds that
since π(p, e Ω ) = 1 and
From (30), (31), (32) and (33) it follows that λ i = 1 for all i ∈ N 2 . Note that due to Pareto optimality of the equilibrium (First Fundamental Welfare Theorem), the price constraint in (23) is binding. This leads to constraint (26). From the equilibrium risks X i , i ∈ N 1 in equilibrium, we derive a value of i∈N 2 X i = i∈N X i − i∈N 1 X i . The equilibrium risk redistributions are Pareto optimal and, so, comonotone. Then, for a given total risk i∈N 2 X i and equilibrium prices, the equilibrium risk redistributions are characterized one-to-one by (27) due to Filipović and Kupper (2008, Theorem 3 .2 therein). Hence, (p, ( X i ) i∈N ) is an equilibrium if and only if we have ( X i ) i∈N ∈ X and the system (25)-(27) holds for some λ ∈ IR N ++ and price vectorp. We proceed with showing the equilibrium price vectorp. The risk redistribution ( X i ) i∈N 1 in equilibrium follows directly from (25). From this, we get i∈N 2 X i = i∈N X i − i∈N 1 X i . Suppose i∈N 2 X i (ω 1 ) < i∈N 2 X i (ω 2 ), so that γ 1 = 0. Then, it follows that there exists at least one i 0 ∈ N 2 such that X i 0 (ω 1 ) < X i 0 (ω 2 ), and so γ i 0 ,1 = 0. From this and γ j,1 ≥ 0 for all j ∈ N 2 it follows from (30), with λ i = 1, that
If the equilibrium prices yield i∈N 2 X i (ω 1 ) = i∈N 2 X i (ω 2 ), it follows from comonotonicity of Pareto optimal risk redistributions that X i (ω 1 ) = X i (ω 2 ) for all i ∈ N 2 . Therefore, it holds that γ i,1 ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N 2 . From this, the fact that
for all x ∈ [0, 1] and all i ∈ N 2 and from the fact that for all x ∈ [0, 1] there exists a j ∈ N 2 such that g j (x) = g * N 2 (x), we get for γ 1 ≥ 0 that
If p > 2 and if i∈N 2 X i (ω 2 ) < i∈N 2 X i (ω 3 ), it follows from (30), with λ i = 1, and (35) that:
and, in line with (35), we get
for all i ∈ N 2 . If the equilibrium prices yield i∈N 2 X i (ω 2 ) = i∈N 2 X i (ω 3 ), we get for γ 2 ≥ 0 that
Continuing this procedure for all states ∈ {1, . . . , p} leads to equilibrium price vectors expressed as function of γ 1 , . . . , γ p−1 as in (28). Finally, we show that for solutions of (25) that the risks X i , i ∈ N 1 are indeed comonotone with i∈N X i . Random variables X and Y are called anti-comonotone when X and −Y are comonotone. Then, we show that any equilibrium price vectorp is such that the random variablep P({ω }) , ∈ {1, . . . , p} is anti-comonotone with i∈N X i . Suppose this is not true, and there exists a state ω such thatp P({ω }) <p +1 P({ω +1 }) . Then, it follows from (29) and the fact that the function u i (·) is continuous and strictly decreasing that X i (ω ) > X i (ω +1 ) for all i ∈ N 1 . From this and i∈N X i (ω ) ≤ i∈N X i (ω +1 ), it follows that i∈N 2 X i (ω ) < i∈N 2 X i (ω +1 ). This is a contradiction with Lemma 3.1. Hence, it holds thatp P({ω }) ≥p +1 P({ω +1 }) . This concludes the proof that the random variablep P({ω }) , ∈ {1, . . . , p}, is anti-comonotone with the risk i∈N X i . From the result thatp P({ω }) , ∈ {1, . . . , p}, is anti-comonotone with the risk i∈N X i and the fact that the functions u i (·), i ∈ N 1 , are continuous and strictly decreasing, we get for the solution of (25) that the risks X i , i ∈ N 1 are indeed comonotone with i∈N X i .
Theorem 4.1 characterizes the competitive equilibrium. For all i ∈ N 2 and for equilibrium price vectorp, we readily get that
We proceed with providing some characteristics of the competitive equilibrium. To do so, we first define the following condition: (25)- (27) witĥ
is such that i∈N 2
The next corollary follows directly from Theorem 4.1.
Corollary 4.2 If condition [C] holds, equilibrium prices are given by (39).
Condition [C] has no direct interpretation, but allows us to compute the equilibrium prices directly from the preferences of the agents in N 2 , and in closed form (Corollary 4.2).
Proposition 4.3 Condition [C] implies that i∈N
Proof Let condition [C] hold, and suppose that i∈N X i (ω 1 ) < · · · < i∈N X i (ω p ) does not hold. Then, there exists an ∈ {1, . . . , p − 1} such that i∈N X i (ω ) = i∈N X i (ω +1 ). Let (25)- (27) hold. For price vectorp as in (39), it holds thatp P({ω }) is strictly decreasing in due to Theorem 4.1. Since the functions u i , i ∈ N 1 are strictly concave, we get X i (ω ) < X i (ω +1 ) for all i ∈ N 1 , and so i∈N
, which is a contradiction due to Lemma 3.1. Hence, condition [C] does not hold. This concludes the proof.
If there exist states ω , ω +1 ∈ Ω such that i∈N X i (ω ) = i∈N X i (ω +1 ), then we get from Corollary 3.2 that for every Pareto optimal redistribution (and so for every competitive equilibrium) it holds that X i (ω ) = X i (ω +1 ) for all i ∈ N . Hence, the probability-weighted equilibrium prices in both states are the same, i.e.,p P({ω }) = p +1 P({ω +1 }) . This implies that we can adjust the problem without loss of generality such
++ . For every X ∈ IR Ω , there is a unique ( X i ) i∈N 1 such that i∈N 1 X i = X andλ (Proposition 3.4) . In this way, we define the function u λ as u λ (X) =λ
The function u λ represents the preferences of every agent in N 1 . Here, the prime on u λ is just a matter of notation. In line with Aase (1993) , we have that u λ is a derivative of some utility function for a representative agent of the set N 1 .
Let λ ∈ IR N 1 ++ be a vector as in the solution of (25)- (28) in Theorem 4.1. It follows from the proof of Theorem 4.1 that equilibrium prices can be determined as if there are just two hypothetical agents in the market: one is endowed with marginal expected utility function u λ and one is endowed with −ρ * N 2
. Moreover, if condition [C] is satisfied, the equilibrium risk redistribution for agents in N 1 depends locally not on the aggregate risk i∈N X i , but on the preferences of the "representative" least risk-averse agent of the set N 2 . Here, we denote risk aversion in dual utility as aversion to mean-preserving spreads.
Next, we focus on condition [C] . From (25), we get
where the probability measure P, random variables and prices are written as vectors, and · is the is the Hadamard (element-wise) product operator. From u i (·) < 0 for all i ∈ N 1 , it follows that u λ (·) is continuous and strictly decreasing. From u i (·) > 0, u i (·) < 0 and that u i satisfies the Inada conditions for all i ∈ N 1 , it follows that u λ (·) has range (0, ∞). Hence, u −1 λ exists. We get i∈N 1
for all ∈ {1, . . . , p − 1}, wherep * is given in (39). Since the function u λ is strictly decreasing and g * N 2
is strictly concave, we find that the righthand side of (41) is strictly positive. The more risk-averse the representative (average risk-averse) agent in N 1 and the representative (least risk-averse) agent in N 2 are, the more strong condition [C] is on the aggregate risk.
Equilibrium prices
In this section, we provide an algorithm that yields an equilibrium price vector. Equilibrium prices in (28) follow from the following algorithm.
1. Setγ = 0 for all ∈ {1, . . . , p − 1}. Solve the system (25)-(26) for givenγ to obtain ( X i ) i∈N .
2. If i∈N 2 X i (ω 1 ) ≤ · · · ≤ i∈N 2 X i (ω p ), then we found the equilibrium price vector; stop here. Otherwise, go to the next step.
X i (ω +z+1 ) with one strict inequality. Take this largest z for which this series of inequalities hold. Then, we need to determinê γ a > 0, a ∈ { , . . . , + z} such that i∈N 2 X i (ω ) = · · · = i∈N 2 X i (ω +z+1 ) for solutions of (25)- (26) with givenγ. Solve the system (25)- (26) for givenγ to obtain ( X i ) i∈N . Then, go back to Step 2.
This procedure has a finite number of iterations due to a finite state space.
In the next proposition, we show that the values γ 1 , . . . , γ p−1 solving this algorithm are unique.
Proposition 4.4 The algorithm above leads to a unique equilibrium price vectorp.
Proof We show that Step 3 above has a unique solution forγ. Let ∈ {1, . . . , p − 1} be the first index for which there exists an z ∈ {0, 1, . . .} such that the corresponding risk redistribution is such that i∈N 2 X i (ω ) ≥ · · · ≥ i∈N 2 X i (ω +z+1 ) with one strict inequality. Therefore, we have i∈N 2 X i (ω −1 ) < i∈N 2 X i (ω ) so thatγ −1 = 0. From (25), we get that X i (ω ), . . . , X i (ω +z+1 ), i ∈ N 1 are solutions of
s ∈ {0, . . . , z}, whereγ −1 = 0, andγ +z+1 is fixed and such thatγ +z+1 = 0 if + z = p. We solve uniqueness of such Lagrangian parameters by mathematical induction, where we vary z. We define Event s, with s ∈ {0, . . . , z − 1}, as follows: For givenγ +s+1 ≥ 0, the values ofγ , . . . ,γ +s such that i∈N 2X i (ω ) = · · · = i∈N 2X i (ω +z+1 ) are unique, and non-negative. Moreover,γ is continuous and strictly increasing in the value ofγ +s+1 .
Step 1: first, we show the result for Event s = 0. Fixγ +1 . Then, the right-hand side of (42) only depends onγ . This equation is continuous and strictly decreasing inγ ≥ 0. Moreover, ifγ = 0, then we get that i∈N 2X i (ω ) ≥ i∈N 2X i (ω +1 ). Moreover, there is a uniqueγ > 0 for whichp
) for all i ∈ N 1 , and so, due to u i (·) < 0, we then have i∈N 2X i (ω ) ≤ i∈N 2X i (ω +1 ). Due to u i (·) < 0, i ∈ N 1 and the Intermediate Value Theorem, we get that there is a unique γ ≥ 0 such that i∈N 2X i (ω ) = i∈N +1X i (ω =1 ). Thisγ is continuous and strictly increasing inγ +1 .
Step 2: suppose that Event s * holds with s * ∈ {0, . . . , z − 2}, i.e.,γ , . . . ,γ +s * are given functions ofγ +s * +1 , andγ is strictly increasing inγ +s * +1 . We show that Event s * + 1 holds, i.e., for every givenγ +s * +2 ≥ 0,γ , . . . ,γ +s * +1 are unique, andγ is continuous and strictly increasing inγ +s * +2 . Fixγ +s * +2 . From (42), we get via iterative multiplications that
(P(Ω +s * +2 )) +γ +s * +1 −γ +s * +2 )/P({ω +s * +2 })
.
The right-hand side of this equation is continuous and strictly increasing inγ ≥ 0. If γ = 0, then we get that i∈N 2 X i (ω ) ≥ i∈N 2 X i (ω +s * +2 ). Moreover, there exists uniqueγ > 0 for whichp
p +s * +2 /P({ω +s * +2 }) = 1, so that i∈N 2 X i (ω ) ≤ i∈N 2 X i (ω +s * +2 ). Due to u i (·) < 0, i ∈ N 1 and the Intermediate Value Theorem, we get that there is a uniqueγ ≥ 0 such that i∈N 2X i (ω ) = i∈N 2X i (ω +s * +2 ). Then,γ +1 , . . . ,γ +s * follow because we assumed that Event s * holds. From (43), we readily see that the value ofγ is continuous and strictly increasing inγ +s * +2 . Hence, Event s * + 1 holds. This concludes the proof, where we show uniqueness of finding the Lagrangian parameterŝ γ , . . . ,γ +z .
We conjecture that the price vector obtained from the algorithm of this section is the only equilibrium price vector that constitutes a competitive equilibrium. In the sequel of this paper, we discuss competitive equilibria only with the equilibrium price vector as in this section.
Uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium, and its capital asset pricing model
In this section, we characterize uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium. From (20), we get that every Pareto optimal risk redistribution for agents depends on the functions m ∈ M and the side-payments d. For the competitive equilibria, the side-payments d are determined. The following condition specifies whether the set M is small enough to guarantee uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium:
, there exists exactly one agent i ∈ N 2 such that g i (P(Ω )) is minimal.
Note that condition [U] is satisfied when the set M in (19) or N 2 is single-valued.
If there exists a globally least risk-averse agent in N 2 , then this agent bears the risk i∈N 2 X i . If there does not exist a globally least risk-averse agent, then it is Pareto optimal that a locally least risk-averse agent bears the risk i∈N 2 X i locally (see (20) Proof The price vector as Section 4.2 is unique (see Proposition 4.4). First, we show that there are unique equilibrium risk profiles ( X i ) i∈N 1 and i∈N 2 X i . Letp be the unique equilibrium price vector from (28). From u i (·) > 0, u i (·) < 0 and that u i satisfies the Inada conditions for all i ∈ N 1 , it follows that u λ (·) is continuous, strictly decreasing and has range (0, ∞). Therefore, we get that the inverse function u −1 i exists.
From (25) (23) is continuous and strictly increasing. Hence, there is a unique λ i solving the budget constraint in (26). So, the risk redistribution ( X i ) i∈N 1 is the same in every equilibrium. Then, so are the risks i∈N 1 X i and i∈N 2 X i . For a given i∈N 2 X i = i∈N X i − i∈N 1 X i , the equilibrium risk redistribution for the group N 2 is determined by Pareto optimal risk redistributions satisfying the price constraint (27). By Boonen (2015, Theorem 3.8 therein) , this is unique if and only if condition [U] holds. This concludes the proof.
If N = N 2 , then it follows from Boonen (2015) that condition [U] and X(ω 1 ) < · · · < X(ω p ) are jointly sufficient to have uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium. If N = N 1 , Aase (1993 Aase ( , 2010 proposes conditions for uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium. His conditions are either assumed in the setting of this paper, or are irrelevant since we assume that the state space Ω is finite.
If condition [C] is not satisfied, we get from Section 4.2 an algorithm to determine equilibrium prices. After we determine the equilibrium price vector, the equilibrium risk redistribution follows from (25)-(27). This method is analogous to the algorithm in Section 3 for Pareto optima, where the vector k is not fixed, but implicitly given by λ −1 which follows from (25)-(26).
If condition [C] holds, the corresponding pricing kernel is given by the following Radon-Nikodym derivative:
for all ∈ {1, . . . , p}. We can test this pricing kernel empirically via the corresponding capital asset pricing model (CAPM). This is done by De Giorgi and Post (2008) for the setting where every agent in the market is endowed with the same distortion risk measure. 4 Using US stock returns, they find a better fit than the classical CAPM with mean-variance investors. If we would test the equilibrium prices, we would assume a functional form of the distortion function g * N 2
, and test (44) empirically. So, testing our model is analogous to the test of De Giorgi and Post (2008) . Hence, De Giorgi and Post (2008) show that our model with dual utilities has a better fit than the CAPM with mean-variance investors.
Even if condition [C] does not hold, we get from Theorem 4.1 the prices in any competitive equilibrium. However, computing any competitive equilibrium may be tedious. It requires to compute equilibrium prices where some Lagrangian parameters are strictly positive (see Theorem 3.3), and thus the corresponding constraints binding.
Competitive equilibrium with Expected Shortfall
As dual utility is related to coherent risk measures, dual utility preferences may be deduced from regulation. For instance, agents (firms) may aim to minimize their riskadjusted value of the liabilities (for more detailed information, see, e.g., Chi, 2012) . Expected Shortfall (see, e.g., Acerbi and Tasche, 2002 ) is a popular risk measure as it is used in Basel III and Swiss Solvency Test regulations. Expected Shortfall is a distortion risk measure, with distortion function g(x) = min{
where α ∈ (0, 1) is the parameter used (Kusuoka, 2001 ). This function is concave but not strictly concave. For this reason, we focus competitive equilibria in the setting that only differs from the setting in Sections 4.1-4.3 by allowing the distortion functions g i , i ∈ N 2 to be concave and non-decreasing.
If we focus on comonotone equilibrium risk redistributions only, we can use a result of Landsberger and Meilijson (1994) . They show that for every risk redistribution, there exists a comonotone risk redistribution that dominates it in the sense of second order stochastic dominance. Since dual utilities with concave distortion functions are preserving second order stochastic dominance (Chew et al., 1987) , there exist competitive equilibria with comonotone risk redistributions. The following result follows directly from this and the proof of Theorem 4.1. Proposition 4.6 Let the set N 2 contain dual utility maximizing agents such that the distortion functions g i , i ∈ N 2 , are all concave and non-decreasing. Then, every equilibrium (p, ( X i ) i∈N ) such that ( X i ) i∈N 2 is comonotone, is a solution of (25)- (28), where the equilibria are defined in (22)-(24).
Remark Suppose there exists an agent i that uses the preference relation V i (X) = E P [X], i.e., it is risk-neutral. Note that this is the only expected utility function that is a dual utility function as well. Then, in every Pareto optimum, this agent will bear all risk, i.e., every Pareto optimum is such that X j is deterministic for all j = i. This observation is consistent with results on expected utility (Borch, 1962) and dual utility (Jouini et al., 2008) . Since the distortion function is linear, it is concave. Therefore, we obtain some competitive equilibria from Proposition 4.6 with i ∈ N 2 .
Remark Proposition 4.6 cannot be generalized to non-concave distortion functions. It is possible that every comonotone risk redistribution is not Pareto optimal (see, e.g., Theorem 4.3 from Embrechts et al., 2016) , and so does not constitute a competitive equilibrium due to the First Fundamental Welfare Theorem (see Arrow, 1963) . Therefore, we do not discuss this case in more detail.
Special case with exponential utilities
In this section, we restrict the expected utility maximizers in N 1 to use exponential expected utility functions, i.e., agent i ∈ N 1 maximizes
where α i > 0. It follows from Aase (1993, equation (4.1) therein) that:
From this and (40), we derive i∈N 1
wherep is defined in (28). Moreover, any Pareto optimal risk redistribution ( X i ) i∈N with exponential utilities in N 1 is such that
for all i ∈ N 1 , where
are constants. Here, (46) follows from (12) and Bühlmann and Jewell (1979) , and (47) follows from substituting (45) in (46). From this, we derive that condition [C] can be written as
, for all ∈ {1, . . . , p − 1}. So, the condition [C] is satisfied whenever the average agent of the set N 1 is relatively risk-averse (small value of i∈N 1 α i ) and the least risk-averse agent in N 2 is relatively little risk-averse (small values of log p P({ω }) − log p +1 P({ω +1 }) ). If N = N 1 , the equilibrium prices are given by Bühlmann (1980) . When the risks X i and j =i X j are independent, the premium for agent i equals the Esscher premium principle. Even if there is just one agent in N 2 with a small risk, we get that equilibrium prices may be very different. x ) for all x ∈ [0, 1]. The state space is given by Ω = {ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 , ω 4 }, with P({ω}) = 1 4 for all ω ∈ Ω. Moreover, let X i = 1 4 X for all i ∈ N , with X(ω k ) = 4k for k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. For our convenience, we write stochastic variables as vectors.
First, we determine the equilibrium risks X 1 , X 2 and X 3 + X 4 via the representative agent of the set N 2 , ρ * N 2
. We find that conditions [C] and [U] are satisfied. So, from Corollary 4.2, we get that equilibrium prices follow from (39):p ≈ (0. 5, 0.207, 0.169, 0.124) . From this, (25) and (27), we get that (p, ( X i ) i∈N ) is a competitive equilibrium, where X 1 ≈ (0.96, 2.31, 2.83, 3.87), X 2 ≈ (1.41, 2.19, 2.42, 2.83), X 3 + X 4 ≈ (1. 63, 3.50, 6.74, 9.30 ).
We also find that M is single-valued, and its unique element m ∈ M is such that m(1) = m(2) = 3 and m(3) = 4, where M is defined in (19) . From this, and equations (20) and (26), we find that X 3 ≈ (0.03, 1.90, 5.14, 5.14) and X 4 ≈ (1.60, 1.60, 1.60, 4.16).
Example 5.2 In this example, we consider the same problem as in Example 5.1, but we vary the value of X(ω 3 ). We get that condition [C] is not satisfied anymore when X(ω 3 ) ∈ [8, 8.70). Let X(ω 3 ) = 8.5. We apply the KKT conditions that are derived in the proof of Theorem 4.1. We obtain that the constraint i∈N X i (ω 2 )− i∈N 1 X i (ω 2 ) ≤ i∈N X i (ω 3 ) − i∈N 1 X i (ω 3 ) is binding. From (28) constitutes a competitive equilibrium. Note that from γ 2 > 0 it follows by construction that X 3 (ω 2 ) = X 3 (ω 3 ) and X 4 (ω 2 ) = X 4 (ω 3 ).
Conclusion
This paper studies optimal risk redistributions in markets with expected and dual theory maximizers. In contrast to previous literature, we study markets where both types of agents are present. Pareto optimal contracts are characterized in a way that extends both the result of Borch (1962) for expected utilities and the result of Jouini et al. (2008) for dual utility maximizers. We derive that under some circumstances, equilibrium prices do not depend on the expected utility maximizers in the market. Moreover, we characterize uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium.
The Pareto optimal and equilibrium risk redistributions follow from the preferences of two hypothetical representative agents. This is an average risk-averse expected utility maximizing agent and dual utility maximizing agent that has lowest aversion to meanpreserving spreads. Given a (non-trivial) allocation of the total risk to both groups, the solution to expected utility maximizers is in line with the well-known result of Borch (1962) applied to their allocated risk as if it were to be the aggregate risk. Moreover, the solution to dual utility maximizing agents is given by a particular tranching of their allocated risk.
An important question that we leave open for future research is what the Pareto optima and competitive equilibria are in case of a continuous state space. This paper characterizes the competitive equilibrium using a finite dimensional optimization problem. This approach cannot be used in case the state space is continuous. Moreover, the equilibrium prices that we characterize in this paper have no trivial translation to the setting with a continuous state space.
